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UNITED STATES V. TUCKER: CAN THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT REALLY ABOLISH THE OUTRAGEOUS
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE?
INTRODUCrION
The "outrageous government conduct" defense,' while a product of
the entrapment doctrine, is founded on the fundamentals of due pro-
cess. 2 It is separate from entrapment, which is based upon the notion
that the defendant must not be convicted because he did not possess
the criminal predisposition to commit the crime prior to the associa-
tion with a government agent.3 Instead, the defendant may prove the
outrageous government conduct defense by showing that the govern-
ment agent, regardless of the defendant's predisposition, acted in such
an "outrageous" manner as to violate the concepts of due process.4
However, the process of successfully proving such a claim is extremely
difficult. As one court stated, "the banner of outrageous misconduct
is often raised, but seldom saluted." 5
1. The term "defense" is arguably a misnomer when used in conjunction with the doctrine of
outrageous government conduct. The essence of an outrageous government conduct claim is
that the government action is so shocking to due process principles that an indictment should
never have been issued. Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: The Jour-
ney Back, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 457, 461 (1990). While an outrageous government conduct
claim is raised by the defendant, some courts have determined that it is not a defense, but rather
an invalidation of the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1300 (9th
Cir 1995) ("Outrageous government conduct is not a defense, but rather a claim that govern-
ment conduct in securing an indictment was so shocking to due process values that the indict-
ment must be dismissed."). The author acknowledges the significant argument that the
outrageous government conduct/due process claim is not technically a "defense," but uses the
term to represent such a claim by a criminal defendant for the sake of simplicity.
2. See Leslie W. Abramson & Lisa L. Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in Federal
Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 139, 140 (1980) ("Constitutional due process principles could abso-
lutely bar a conviction acquired because of outrageous police misconduct.") (quoting United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)).
3. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(b) at 423 (2d ed. 1986)
("A defendant is considered predisposed if he is 'ready and willing to commit the crimes such as
are charged in the indictment, whenever opportunity was afforded.' ") (quoting 1 E. DEVrrr &
C. BLACKMAN, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.09 (3d ed. 1977)).
4. Marcus, supra note 1, at 458 ("The Due Process defense looks to the activities of the gov-
ernment officers - rather than the activities of the defendant - in an attempt to determine
whether the government has overstepped the boundaries of what Justice Cardozo called stan-
dards 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ") (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
5. United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993).
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Because of the confusion surrounding its origin, 6 the unsettled
Supreme Court authority supporting it, 7 and its inconsistent applica-
tion by federal courts,8 one circuit court has abolished the defense. 9
While sympathetic to the troubles the "outrageous government con-
duct" defense has caused the courts, this Note will demonstrate that
complete abolition is not only inconsistent with case law, but will also
have a detrimental impact on the criminal justice system and on all
potential criminal defendants.
This Note will first analyze the origins of the due process defense,' 0
beginning with the advent of the entrapment doctrine in Sorrells v.
United States" and later reaffirmed in Sherman v. United States.12
Although in these cases, the Supreme Court majority emphatically
stated that the subjective predisposition test should be used for en-
trapment, concurring justices suggested that an objective test might be
more consistent with the Constitution and principles of public policy.
Furthermore, this Note will analyze the important dicta in United
States v. Russell,13 wherein Justice Rhenquist created the "outrageous
government conduct" defense. He stated that, in extreme situations,
there may someday be such a violation of a criminal defendant's rights
of due process by a government agent as to warrant the dismissal of
that defendant's indictment.' 4 This "someday" concept was supported
three years later by a five to three Supreme Court majority in Hamp-
ton v. United States.' 5
Next, this Note will demonstrate the various ways the federal
courts have attempted to apply the due process defense, usually with
little success for the defendant. The discussion will then focus on the
6. See infra notes 17-63 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of the entrapment
doctrine on the origins of the outrageous government conduct defense).
7. See infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme Court decisions involving
outrageous government conduct cases).
8. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (analyzing the inconsistent federal court ap-
plication of the defense).
9. See United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1426-27 (6th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
1426 (1995) (stating that "based on the lack of binding precedent from either the Supreme Court
or the Sixth Circuit, we are of the view that this panel is not required to recognize the 'due
process' defense"); see also United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the doctrine of outrageous government conduct does not exist in the Seventh Circuit).
10. For purposes of this Note, "outrageous government conduct" and the "due process de-
fense" are synonymous and used interchangeably.
11. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
12. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
13. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
14. Id. at 431-32.
15. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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Sixth Circuit's failure to apply the defense in United States v. Tucker.16
The Note will then explain why the court's analysis is flawed and dis-
cuss possible effects of the extinction of this much needed check on
government action. Finally, this Note will attempt to demonstrate the
need for the continued use of the due process defense because of its
importance to both criminal defendants and the criminal justice
system.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Entrapment and the Origins of the Predisposition Test
Any study of "outrageous government conduct" must begin with an
examination of entrapment. While it is currently considered a com-
pletely separate defense, the outrageous government conduct de-
fense's origins can be traced to the creation of entrapment in Sorrells
v. United States.' 7 In Sorrells, the defendant had been prodded into
purchasing liquor for a government agent in violation of federal prohi-
bition after the agent had posed as a visiting tourist and war veteran. 18
The agent asked Sorrells to obtain liquor for him on three separate
occasions; the defendant finally agreed to the last request. 19 After ex-
amining the defendant's predisposition, the Court held that the con-
trolling factor was whether or not the defendant was innocent but for
the actions of the government agents. 20 The Court found that Sorrells
lacked the required predisposition to sell liquor.21 Only after re-
peated requests by the government agent did he violate federal law.22
Thus, in Sorrells, the Supreme Court held that the sole purpose of the
government agent's behavior was to create a crime in order to later
punish the crime's participant.23 This behavior was considered entrap-
16. 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
17. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
18. Id. at 439-40.
19. Id at 439.
20. Id. at 451.
21. Id. at 452.
22. Id.
23. ld. at 441, 451. The majority concluded that the government agent "lured [the] defendant,
otherwise innocent, to [the crime's] commission by repeated and persistent solicitation in which
he succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their exper-
iences as companions in arms in the World War." Id. at 441. The majority continued that this
factual situation raised "the controlling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise
innocent whom the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product
of the creative activity of its own officials. If that is the fact, common justice requires that the
accused be permitted to prove it." Id. at 451.
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ment and barred a successful prosecution because the Sorrells Court
deemed it "so shocking to the sense of justice. '2 4
The majority in Sorrells justified its creation of the entrapment de-
fense by examining hidden Congressional intent.2 5 The Court stated
that Congress intends to prohibit a certain action when it passes a
law.2 6 It believed, however, that Congress did not intend for its law to
be upheld if there is government action that is "abhorrent to the sense
of justice. '2 7 While Congress intended to proscribe a given behavior,
it did not intend to override the needs of plain public policy and the
proper administration of justice.28 Therefore, the Supreme Court hy-
pothesized that in certain situations, Congress did not actually intend
for its laws to be upheld in contradiction of these important societal
needs.29 The Court found that a conviction of Sorrells would demon-
strate such a contradiction and dismissed the complaint against him. 30
The Supreme Court majority affirmed the entrapment defense and
reiterated this justification in Sherman v. United States.31 In Sherman,
a government agent solicited drugs from the defendant as the defend-
ant was attempting to overcome his drug addiction.32 The Court held
that entrapment would bar Sherman's prosecution. 33 Relying on the
"hidden Congressional intent" justification, which originated in Sor-
rells, the Court stated that, while the Constitution gave the executive
branch authority to enforce the laws that Congress creates, these laws
are not to be upheld when the government manufactures a crime to
24. Id. at 446. The Court reasoned that it could not apply a statute to Sorrells under the
circumstances. It felt:
[T]hat such an application is so shocking to the sense of justice that it has been urged
that it is the duty of the court to stop the prosecution in the interest of the government
itself, to protect it from the illegal conduct of its officers and preserve the purity of its
courts.
Id. (citing Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 419, 423 (1928)).
25. Id. at 448.
26. See id. at 445-46 (stating that the legislature is the "arbiter of public policy").
27. Id. at 449.
28. Id. at 448.
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this
statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instiga-
tion by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in
order to lure them to its commission and to punish them.
Id.
29. Id. at 448-49.
30. Id.
31. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
32. Id. at 371.
33. Id. at 378.
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trap an unwary defendant. 34 Sherman affirmed the entrapment de-
fense, as well as the hidden Congressional intent justification found in
Sorrells.35 These decisions created a solid defense for defendants who
could show that the government agent instigated the crime, providing
that same defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime prior to
the government involvement.
B. The Origins of the Objective Due Process Test
The Supreme Court majorities in Sorrells and Sherman based their
entrapment test on the defendant's predisposition for crime. 36 This
determination is a subjective one, focusing on the mental state of the
defendant.37 The concurring Justices in these two cases used an alter-
native approach.38 This approach ignores the subjective predisposi-
tion of the defendant by focusing instead on the action of the
government agents.39 Subsequent decisions dubbed this analysis the
objective test for entrapment because it requires the courts to look to
the overall legality of the government action.40 Both Justice Roberts
in Sorrells,41 and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman42 advocated the use
of the objective test for entrapment. Justice Roberts opined that not
only is the objective test the correct analysis, but that it is the actual
test used by the majority in Sorrells.43 He suggested that the hidden
Congressional intent theory justifying the majority's opinion was un-
34. See id. at 372 ("Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by
tempting innocent persons into violations.").
35. Id. at 377-78 (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932)).
36. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1958).
37. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 3, § 5.2(b) at 422. The authors state that "the majority view
is usually referred to as the 'subjective approach', but can be called the federal approach or the
Sorrells-Sherman doctrine." Id.
38. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378-85 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. See Molly K. Nichols, Comment, Entrapment and Due Process: How Far Is Too Far?, 58
TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1210-11 (1984) (stating that the test articulated by Justices Frankfurter and
Roberts has become known as the objective test of entrapment).
41. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
42. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts stated that the same
policy of protecting the purity of the government and its functions that does not allow the courts
to uphold civil remedies where the remedy would aid "the perpetration and consummation of an
illegal scheme" is applied to criminal law. Id. at 455. He stated that courts "cannot consummate
a wrong" and that this reasoning "is the real basis of the decisions approving the defense of
entrapment, though in statement the rule is cloaked under a declaration that the government is
estopped and the defendant has not been proved guilty." Id.
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warranted. 44 He felt the majority bases its true reasoning upon a fun-
damental public policy issue: the protection of government's functions
and preservation of its overall integrity.45 Justice Roberts argued it
was the court's responsibility "to protect itself and the government
from prostitutions of criminal law."' 46 Because Justice Roberts held
this policy consideration as the main goal of the entrapment defense,
he felt that the majority was not really concerned with the mental
state of the defendant, but simply in making sure that the government
does not overstep its bounds. 47
Similarly, in his concurrence in Sherman, Justice Frankfurter reiter-
ated much of Justice Roberts' opinion regarding the true motives of
the subjective approach to entrapment. 48 He also criticized the major-
ity's justification for the entrapment defense. He felt that the "hidden
44. In response to the hidden congressional intent theory, Justice Roberts called this a
"strained and unwarranted construction of the statute; [which] amounts, in fact, to judicial
amendment. It is not merely broad construction, but addition of an element not contained in the
legislation." Id. at 456. He continued that this unwarranted application creates more problems
because "no guide or rule is announced as to when a statute shall be read as excluding a case of
entrapment; and no principle of statutory construction is suggested which would enable us to say
that it is excluded by some statutes and not by others." Id. at 457.
45. Id.
The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its
own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the
court. It is the province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal law.
Id.
46. Id.
47. See Abramson & Lindeman, supra note 2, at 141-42 (agreeing with Justice Roberts' con-
tention that the majority cloaked its analysis in statutory interpretation, but really embraced the
due process theory). In explaining the majority's analysis, the authors state:
While the Court's analysis focused upon whether or not the defendant's conduct was
within the confines of the statute, it also set forth a basis or theory for scrutiny of police
conduct. Although not specifically labeled a "due process" theory, a principle of fair-
ness seems implicit in the Court's rationale.
It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for
which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent .... Such
a gross abuse of authority given for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime,
and not for the making of criminals, deserves the severest condemnation, but the
question whether it precludes prosecution or affords a ground of defense, and, if so
upon what theory, has given rise to conflicting opinions.
Id. at 141 (quoting Sorrells v. United States 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)).
48. 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter felt that
courts will decide that certain government action should not be tolerated because "public confi-
dence in the fair and honorable administration of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule
of law, is the transcending value at stake." Id. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He also
stated that the court appropriately used an objective test here because looking to the predisposi-
tion "loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense." Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Government conduct, such as that of the agents in Sherman cannot be "tolerated in an
advanced society." Id. at 383 (Franfurter, J., concurring).
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intent of Congress" rationale was "sheer fiction. ' 49 In Justice Frank-
furter's opinion, Congress intends only one thing when it enacts laws:
to proscribe a given act or omission.50 With this justification unavaila-
ble to the courts, the real justification for the entrapment defense was
that Congress enacted laws knowing that the Constitution gave the
courts the authority to oversee the administration of justice.51 Thus,
when the government acted in such a way as to unfairly induce a per-
son to act "criminally," the defendant must not be prosecuted.5 2 Jus-
tice Frankfurter views this determination as an objective one, looking
to the government action regardless of the mental state of the
defendant.5 3
In sum, there are two tests applied to the entrapment defense: the
subjective test established by the Supreme Court majorities in Sorrells
and Sherman, and the objective test advanced first by Justice Roberts
in Sorrells, then by Justice Frankfurter in Sherman. The federal courts
and a majority of state courts use the subjective approach.5 4 The ob-
jective approach, however, has support as well.5 5 Although described
49. Id. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter stated that "[i]t is surely sheer
fiction to suggest that a conviction cannot be had when a defendant has been entrapped by
government officers or informers because 'Congress could not have intended that its statutes
were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.'" Id.
50. Id. "In these cases raising claims of entrapment, the only legislative intention that can
with any show of reason be extracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal precisely
the conduct in which the defendant has engaged." Id.
51. Id. at 381. Justice Frankfurter stated that Congress enacts laws that are completely silent
on the issue of entrapment because these laws are passed "on the basis of certain presupposi-
tions concerning the established legal order and the rule of the courts within that system in
formulating standards for the administration of criminal justice." Id.
52. Id. at 383. "Certain police conduct to ensnare [a defendant with a criminal record] into
further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society." Id.
53. Id. at 384-85. Frankfurter gave the courts factors to consider in determining whether the
action is objectively inconsistent with the fundamentals of justice. Id. These factors include the
following: "appeals to sympathy, the setting the inducement took place, the nature of the crime
involved, its secrecy and difficulty of detection, and the manner in which the criminal business is
usually carried on." Id.
54. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 3, § 5.2(b), at 422.
55. See generally id. § 5.2(c), at 601 n.30 (listing the following eight sources supporting the
objective approach: NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORK-
INo PAPERS 303-28 (1970); LAWRENCE TIFFANY ET AL, DETECTION OF CRIME 265-72 (1967);
Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agents Provocat-
eurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Losswell: Some Reflections on
Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683 (1975);
Paul W. Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28
FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1959); Beth Ela, Comment, Predisposition of Defendant Crucial Factor
in Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 546 (1974); Reid Carron, Comment, Entrapment-
A Critical Discussion, 37 Mo. L. REV. 633 (1972); Stephen Clare Hoffman, Note, State v. Glen-
don Johnson: The Entrapment Defense is Sprung on South Dakota, 24 S.D. L. REV. 510 (1979));
id. at 601 n.31 (citing the Model Penal Code § 2.13 as recommending the objective approach); id.
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by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter as a test to ensure that govern-
ment limits its action to the fair and honorable administration of jus-
tice, these concepts are closely tied to due process.56
The essential case for analyzing due process in this context is
Rochin v. California.57 Rochin held that the courts may determine
that if the actions of government "shock the conscience," a conviction
cannot be upheld.5 8 The police found Rochin lying on his bed in his
bedroom with two capsules sitting on his night stand.59 Upon seeing
the police, Rochin swallowed the capsules.60 The police took Rochin
to the hospital, pumped his stomach, and determined that the capsules
contained morphine.61 The Court held that convictions cannot be ob-
tained by methods that "offend a 'sense of justice.' "62 They felt such
methods were used against Rochin.63 The objective test of entrap-
ment is closely tied to these due process concepts illustrated in
Rochin. Justice Rehnquist combined these two concepts when he cre-
ated the "outrageous government conduct" defense in United States v.
Russell.
C. The Formation of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense
With the two competing tests for entrapment serving as a back-
ground, the Supreme Court created an entirely new defense based on
due process principles in United States v. Russell.64 Although the doc-
trine of entrapment played an important role in the creation of the
at 601 n.32 (citing Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969) as the objective standard's first
authoritative acceptance); id. at 601 n.33-34 (listing other states in addition to Alaska which have
adopted the objective approach by statute or judicial decision, including Hawaii, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Arkansas, North Dakota, Colorado, New Hampshire, Florida, Texas, Utah, Cali-
fornia, Vermont, Iowa, and Michigan)).
56. Due process has been defined as "a constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal
immunities which, as Justice Cordozo twice wrote for the Court, are 'so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental,' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' " Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
57. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
58. Id. at 172. "[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energeti-
cally; this conduct shocks the conscience." Id.
59. Id. at 166.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 173. "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining,
and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.'" Id. (quoting Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)).
63. Id.
64. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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outrageous government conduct defense, the two are nonetheless
completely separate defenses. The primary difference lies in the tests
used to prove each defense. Courts use a predisposition test to deter-
mine if entrapment will bar a successful prosecution. 65 Conversely,
the deciding factor for determining outrageous government conduct is
the propriety of the governmental action. 66 Thus, an objective test
looks not to the mental state of the defendant, but rather to the actual
methods employed by the government.67
Justice Rhenquist created the objective/due process test through
dicta in United States v. Russell.68 While defeating an entrapment
claim brought by the defendant and reaffirming the subjective predis-
position test for the entrapment defense, Justice Rhenquist stopped
short of completely eliminating the possibility of a defense based
solely on the government's conduct.69 He stated, "while we may some
day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process principles would abso-
lutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that breed. '70
In Russell's situation, Justice Rhenquist felt the government action
"stopped far short of violating that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to
the universal sense of justice.' "71 Justice Rhenquist also reaffirmed
the Sorrells/Sherman justification for the entrapment defense. 72 He
stated that Congress did not intend for a defendant to be punished if
he was induced to commit the crime by government agents.73 Except
65. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (holding "the question is whether
the defense ... takes the case out of the purview of the statute because... its enactment should
[not] be used to support such a gross perversion of its purpose"); Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 376-77 (1958) (reaffirming Sorrells).
66. See LAFAVE & Scoarr, supra note 3, § 5.2(3), at 424 ("If government agents have insti-
gated the commission of a crime, then the courts should not in effect approve that 'abhorrent
transaction' by permitting the induced individual to be convicted.") (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
458-59 (Roberts, J., concurring)).
67. Id.
68. 411 U.S. at 431-32.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
72. See id. at 434 ("We are content to leave the matter where it was left by the Court in
Sherman .... ).
73. Id. at 435. In limiting the defense, Justice Rhenquist reiterated the Sorrells/Sherman
justification:
It is rooted, not in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what
it feels to have been "overzealous law enforcement," but instead in the notion that
Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has com-
mitted all the elements of a proscribed offense but was induced to commit them by the
Government.
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for Justice Rhenquist's dicta giving the possibility of a due process
defense to criminal defendants, Russell reaffirmed all the existing as-
pects of the entrapment doctrine.74
Three years later, the Supreme Court gave weight to this dicta in
Russell as a Court majority ruled in favor of the availability of a due
process defense to criminal defendants. In Hampton v. United
States,75 a majority of the Court again rejected a defendant's claim of
entrapment based on the facts, but was unable to completely ignore
the "someday" dicta stated by Justice Rhenquist in Russell.76 Rather
than completely ignore the dicta, the Court, including the dissent, held
that a due process defense based on the impropriety of the govern-
ment's agents is available to criminal defendants. 77
In Hampton, the lower court convicted the defendant of selling her-
oin, which was both supplied by and sold to government agents.78 Jus-
tice Rhenquist, writing for the plurality, retreated from his earlier
"maybe someday" language in Russell, and held that a due process
defense claim can never be successful outside of the Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure context.79 He ruled that because Hampton's
case was not of this kind, due process was not violated; furthermore,
since the defendant possessed the requisite predisposition for the of-
fense, an entrapment defense was not available to him.80 As a result
of this holding, Justice Rhenquist attempted to destroy the very de-
fense he created in Russell.81 However, this portion of his opinion
failed to gain a majority of the Court.82 Justice Powell, joined by Jus-
Id. at 435.
74. Id. at 432, 435.
75. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
76. Id. at 490-91.
77. Id. at 490; see also id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justices Powell and
Blackmun that there should remain a due process defense to defendants who have been improp-
erly induced by government agents, and with Justices Stewart and Marshall that not only should
such a defense exist, but that the defense should be applied in Hampton's case, thereby defeating
his criminal prosecution).
78. Id. at 485-86.
79. Id. at 490 (1976). "The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
come into play only when the government activity in question violates some protected right of
the defendant." Id. at 490-91. Here, Justice Rhenquist concluded that there was no protected
right of the defendant infringed upon by the government agent. Id. He felt that the defendant
and the government agent acted in concert with one another. Id.
80. Id. at 490.
81. In Hampton, Justice Rhenquist stated that due process could never be violated where the
defendant possessed the necessary predisposition. Id. But in Russell, Justice Rhenquist stated
that there could possibly be instances where a defendant's due process rights were violated re-
gardless of that defendant's state of mind. 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
82. Justice Rhenquist's plurality opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice White
in its entirety, and by Justices Powell and Blackmun as to the result in Hampton. Hampton, 425
952 [Vol. 45:943
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tice Blackmun, concurred in holding that the due process defense was
not available to Hampton in this situation.83 However, they refused to
join the plurality in holding that such an option should never be made
available to criminal defendants. 84 These two Justices, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, who felt that the due process
claim should be successful in Hampton's situation,8 5 created a major-
ity opinion holding that the due process/outrageous government con-
duct defense exists for criminal defendants. 86
Although tenuous, this group upheld the defense created in dicta by
Justice Rhenquist in Russell. Thus, by a five to three majority, the
Supreme Court upheld a defense that objectively looks to the conduct
of the government agents for violations of fundamental rights of due
process. 87 Hampton expressly states that where government conduct
is offensive to the extent these fundamental rights are impinged, the
courts have the power to bar a defendant's prosecution.88 This deter-
mination is to be made without consideration of the state of mind of
the defendant, and without considering his predisposition. 89
Even though the Hampton majority solidified the due process/out-
rageous conduct defense, there have been many problems with its ap-
plication. One unsettled area of the defense is the judicial authority
vested in the courts to make such a due process determination. Some
courts have questioned the Supreme Court's power to engage in such
an analysis. 90
D. Judicial Authority to Rule on Government Conduct
A key factor in the battle between the use of the subjective ap-
proach to entrapment and the objective due process approach to out-
rageous government conduct is whether a judge or a jury decides the
proper approach to be used. For the subjective test of entrapment,
U.S. at 492. However, these two justices joined three others on the issue of the availability of the
due process defense. Id. at 497.
83. Id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 492-93.
85. Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 492, 497.
87. Id. at 497.
88. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1421 (6th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
1426 (1995) (ruling that federal courts are without judicial authority to make a due process de-
termination in entrapment-like factual situations); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1272
(7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (recommending the abolishment of the due process
defense because it is too vague and undefined to give "subjective" judges the power to override
convictions).
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the jury hears the evidence of the defendant's state of mind and de-
cides it as a factual issue.91 The due process issue, however, is a legal
question decided by a judge.92 The power of the judiciary to resolve
that issue evolved from McNabb v. United States.93 In McNabb, the
Supreme Court gave the judiciary the authority to oversee the crimi-
nal justice system.94 The Court stated that the scope of federal court
review is not limited to only matters of law or constitutional viola-
tions, but also includes "the duty of establishing and maintaining civi-
lized standards of procedure and evidence. '95 This process of judicial
administration is not to be left solely to the law enforcement agents of
the executive branch; it is also within the purview of the judicial
system.96
The Court in Rochin v. United States97 further discussed its author-
ity to review due process claims brought against the government. The
Court in Rochin stated that one of the duties of the court system is to
"reconcile the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive
society."'98 In order to do this, the Court placed confidence in self-
critical and self-disciplined judges.99 The Court felt that society has a
right to request that its judges make informed decisions regarding the
propriety of government action.' 00 Justice Roberts held a similar view
in his concurring opinion in Sorrells. He stated that in order for the
court to protect its own functions, it must be allowed to make due
process determinations. 10 1
91. LAFAVE & Sco-r'r, supra note 3, § 5.2(f)(2), at 428.
92. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 459 ("The due process contention, which focuses on the
limitations of the Constitution, is determined by the judge as a matter of law."); see also United
States v. Sotelo-Murillo, 887 F.2d 176, 182 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Whether the government's conduct
is sufficiently outrageous to violate due process is a question of law.... It is not an issue for the
jury and [the defendant] was not entitled to a jury instruction on this issue.").
93. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
94. Id. at 340; see also Nichols, supra note 40, at 1216-17 (stating that in McNabb, the Supreme
Court expanded the federal court's review beyond "the contours of the Constitution," enabling
the court system to share in the responsibility of the administration of justice with the law en-
forcement community).
95. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340.
96. Id. at 343-44.
97. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
98. Id. at 172.
99. Id. at 171-72. The Court expressed the possible difficulties facing judges in making vague
due process determinations when it stated, "[t]o practice the requisite detachment and to
achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-
criticism, incertitude ... and alert tolerance toward views not shared." Id. at 171.
100. Id. at 172. In response to the challenges that face judges, the Rochin Court stated "these
are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society
has a right to expect from those entrusted with ultimate judicial power." Id.
101. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring). He stated,
"[t]he violation of the [due process] principles of justice by the entrapment of the unwary into
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Although the Court's authority to rule on due process claims was
advanced in McNabb'0 2 and Rochin,10 3 the Court retreated from this
position in United States v. Payner.10 4 In Payner, the Court denied a
Fourth Amendment exclusion of incriminating evidence that govern-
ment agents obtained by riffling through a briefcase. 10 5 Alternatively,
the defendants contended that the government agents gathered evi-
dence through willfully lawless activities, and therefore, should be
suppressed under the Due Process clause and the court's supervisory
power.'0 6 The Supreme Court rejected this claim.'0 7 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell stated that the Fourth Amendment is a clear-
cut rule, and if it is not applicable, it should not be replaced by ill-
defined supervisory or due process standards. 08 Justice Powell con-
tinued that even if the Court were to find that the government behav-
ior offended fundamental "canons of decency and fairness,"'109 the
Due Process Clause could only be invoked where another protected
right of the defendant was violated.110 This language adopts the core
of Justice Rhenquist's plurality opinion in Hampton, which stated that
the due process defense is not available to defendants."'
Payner leaves unsettled the question of judicial authority to rule on
due process claims. While Payner suggests another right besides due
process must be violated, a majority of the justices in Hampton stated
crime should be dealt with by the court no matter by whom or at what stage of the proceedings
the facts are brought to its attention." Id.
102. The McNabb Court emphasized that "[t]he history of liberty has largely been the history
of observance of procedural safeguards. And the effective administration of criminal justice
hardly requires disregard of fair procedures imposed by law." 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
103. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
104. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
105. Id. at 732. The incriminating evidence consisted of bank documents stored in the brief-
case of a bank employee. Id. The Court reasoned that Payner "possessed no privacy interests"
in the documents illegally seized from the bank employee. Id. Because the defendant lacked a
privacy interest in another individual's briefcase, the Court concluded that the defendant lacked
standing to bring a constitutional claim under the search and seizure clause of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 731-32.
106. Id. at 731.
107. Id. at 735.
108. Id. at 736-37. The Court was wary of expanding the power of the courts through the use
of the supervisory power. Id. at 737. It stressed that the competing interests of law enforcement
and the needs of the individual, which are balanced in Fourth Amendment determinations, are
not to be discarded when the supervisory power is used. Id. at 736. With this function apparent
in a Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court discouraged a use of the unclear supervisory power
standards. ld. at 737. It warned "[w]ere we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we
would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far." Id.
109. Id. at 737 n.9 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
110. Id. (citing Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
111. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490.
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that the due process defense alone is available to defendants where
government conduct is "outrageous." The Payner decision further
confused the due process defense. As a result of the varying ap-
proaches taken by the Supreme Court Justices in Sorrells, Sherman,
Russell, Hampton, and now Payner, the federal courts have been with-
out any settled rules on which to resolve the due process issue. The
variety in these courts' interpretations of the state of the defense
demonstrate this confusion.
E. Federal Courts' Attempts to Define the Due Process Defense
Despite the creation of the due process defense in Russell, the
Supreme Court failed to establish any guidelines for courts to use in
determining what conduct of law enforcement agents would be "so
outrageous" that the due process defense may be invoked. 112 Thus,
federal courts have been inconsistent in their application of the due
process defense. One consistency is certain however - the defense is
seldom successful. 113 Despite its lack of success, the defense has been
held as one with existing vitality for criminal defendants. 114 However,
its actual application has remained inconsistent and unclear.
While some courts developed tests that apply factors to determine if
government conduct violated the defendant's due process, 115 eventu-
112. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding government con-
duct outrageous because defendant's right of fundamental fairness was impinged by the govern-
ment); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the government
engaged in outrageous conduct where it essentially manufactured the crime in which the defend-
ant was convicted).
114. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1992) (listing ten circuits which
have used an application of the defense and concluding "[w]e know of no circuit that has denied
the viability of this defense. Thus, outrageous conduct is a viable defense."). The federal circuits
have continued to accept the viability of the defense even after the Sixth Circuit "abolished" the
defense in Tucker. See infra notes 220-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Tucker
holding).
115. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(suggesting factors to determine a subjective test to entrapment, many of which have been used
by courts as factors for a due process violation); United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 363 (6th
Cir. 1991) (listing four factors which are to control a due process determination in the Sixth
Circuit); People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978) (relying on four factors to
determine a due process violation had occurred). The factors the New York State Court of
Appeals used in Isaacson are:
1) [W]hether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not likely have
occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity; 2) whether the
police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of
justice; 3) whether the defendant's reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by ap-
peals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past friendship, by temptation of
exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness; and 4) whether
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ally courts seem to resolve each case on its specific facts.116 The
courts have held that they must look to the "totality of the circum-
stances," with no one factor controlling the decision. 117 Federal courts
managed to break down an outrageous government conduct claim
into three areas: 1) government behavior that "shocks the con-
science," 118 2) situations where it appears that the government agents
manufactured the crime,119 and 3) government conduct that violates
concepts of "fundamental fairness.' 20
1. Government Conduct Which "Shocks the Conscience"
While rarely successful, claims of outrageous government conduct
brought by criminal defendants are consistently given consideration
by federal courts. One category of government conduct given consid-
eration has been characterized as conduct "that shocks the con-
science" of the court. 121 Clearly, the type of mental or physical
coercion employed by the government agents in Rochin meets this
standard. 22 In order to constitute a Due Process violation, coercion
must be at a high level and must be particularly egregious.1 23 The
Ninth Circuit attempted to illustrate such egregious government coer-
cion in United States v. Bogart.124 The defendant in Bogart claimed
the record reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police
motive is to prevent further crime or protect the populace.
378 N.E.2d at 83.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Ultimately, every
case must be resolved on its own particular facts."); see also Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d
783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971) (listing a number of specific types of inappropriate government be-
havior, stating that all the factors considered individually did not bar the prosecution of the
defendant, but holding that considering all the factors together, under the totality of the circum-
stances, the government agents violated concepts of due process, and engaged in outrageous
behavior).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1108 (1982) ("Although a totality of circumstances standard must be applied, it is beneficial to
review the parts that made up the whole.").
118. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (observing that "the proceedings
by which [Rochin's] conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically; this is conduct that
shocks the conscience").
119. See, e.g., Greene, 454 F.2d at 787 (stating "[we] don't believe the government may involve
itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of time in the creation and mainte-
nance of criminal operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators").
120. See, e.g., United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1989) ("We see substantial
reason to scrutinize these operations for government overreaching and to do so with the greatest
care.").
121. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).
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that he was wrongfully jailed on a "trumped up" charge for six
months, given excessive bail, and forced to sell cocaine in order to
make bail and be released from prison. 125 Bogart argued that he was
effectively coerced by government agents to secure his freedom from
a wrongful incarceration. 126 The Bogart court held that this fact pat-
tern, if true, would constitute outrageous government conduct and
would bar conviction based on principles of due process. 27
Another often quoted example of a situation where all courts would
agree that government action was outrageous was offered by Judge
Friendly in United States v. Archer. 28 Judge Friendly stated, "[t]here
is a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime. It would be
unthinkable, for example, to permit government agents to instigate
robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other
members of a gang of hoodlums."'1 29 However, such clear cut exam-
ples are rarely presented to the courts. Usually, defendants are mixed
up in activities deemed by society as detrimental, and therefore defer-
ence is given to the police in order to ensure a correction of this socie-
tal wrong. This balancing is most commonly apparent in the drug
trade. 30
125. Id. at 1430-31.
126. Id. at 1430.
127. Id. at 1438. The Bogart court concluded that government conduct shocks the conscience
"where the police conduct involved unwarranted physical, or perhaps mental, coercion. How-
ever, also constitutionally unacceptable are those hopefully few cases where the crime is
fabricated entirely by the police to secure the defendant's conviction, rather than to protect the
public from the defendant's continuing criminal behavior." Id.
128. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
129. Id. at 676-70; see also People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78,87 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that the conduct of the New York police was outrageous where, in order to secure the services of
an informant, the police had used trickery and deceit, along with physical force such as striking
the informant hard enough to knock him out of his chair, kicking him in the ribs, mouth, and
forehead, and threatening to shoot him and throw him down a flight of stairs).
130. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (upholding petitioner's conviction
where he sold heroin to government agent which had been supplied to him by a government
informant and jury found he was predisposed to the crime); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973) (upholding respondent's conviction where he had been involved in making drugs
before agents visit and where respondent concealed that he may have harbored a criminal pre-
disposition); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding government's in-
volvement in underlying cocaine transaction as both buyer and seller was not outrageous
conduct); United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that government con-
duct was not outrageous where agent sold cocaine for a low price and there was no evidence that
government knew or took advantage of defendant's addiction); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d
1265 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding government actions were not outrageous where agents employed
informant who was both cocaine addict as well as defendant's former girlfriend on a contingent
fee basis); United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding government conduct was
not outrageous where agents established laboratory supplies and technical assistance in manu-
facturing narcotics).
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Since the inception of the entrapment defense in Sorrells, the courts
have made it clear that government agents are given "artifice and
stratagem" in order to "catch those engaged in criminal enter-
prises."1' 31 Because law enforcement agents are given this power,
courts have found it very difficult to determine what government con-
duct is so extreme as sufficient to "shock the conscience."' 132 This dis-
crepancy in the definition of outrageous conduct is exhibited by the
discretion in which the government employs its informants. 133 In
United States v. Simpson,134 the government employed an informant
who was a heroin addict, prostitute, fugitive from Canadian justice,
and involved in a sexual relationship with the defendant.135 The court
allowed her use as an informant. 136 Courts have also determined that
informants can be paid on a contingency fee basis.137 Government
agents can also dangle rich incentives of financial gain before the de-
fendants in order to help induce their commission of the crime. 138
None of these actions are considered to "shock the conscience."
One problem facing courts is the difficulty determining what is
shocking. What is shocking to a judge, may not be shocking to a fed-
eral law enforcement agent in the field, and what is shocking to one
131. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
132. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (detailing government agent's
actions which included illegal entry, forcibly opening petitioner's mouth and extracting the con-
tents of his stomach).
133. See Gail M. Greaney, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law En-
forcement Justification, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 745, 773-80 (1992) (discussing the lack of
guidelines or a precise definition with which to apply the defense).
134. 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1991). The Simpson case is an excellent example of the differ-
ences of judicial opinion that can stall a due process defense. The original district court decision
dismissed the indictment using the outrageous government conduct defense. United States v.
Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1471 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 898 (1987). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the due process claim, reversed and remanded. Id. On re-
mand, the district court again dismissed the indictment using its supervisory powers. United
States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991). On second appeal, the Ninth Circuit
again reversed and remanded the decision instructing the district court to reinstate the indict-
ment. Id. at 1091. The Court of Appeals felt the use of supervisory powers was unwarranted.
Id.
135. Simpson, 927 F.2d at 1089.
136. Id. Judge Kozinski demonstrated the irreverence with which some judges treat defend-
ants' outrageous government conduct claims by holding that the informant in the Simpson case
"was a prostitute, heroin user and fugitive from Canadian justice; but otherwise she was okay."
Id. at 1089.
137. Owen v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986). But see United States v.
Solorio, 37 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a contingency fee plan was outrageous when it
was dependent on a conviction of the defendant and proportionate to the amount of illegal
contraband seized).
138. See United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing government agents
to approach a college student and offer him a $200,000 finder's fee to secure a supply of cocaine
for the agents).
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judge may not be shocking to another.139 Because of the difficulties
associated with its application, one commentator, Donald A. Dripps,
has advocated the abolition of the outrageous government conduct
defense because of this inconsistency. 140 Dripps argues that judges
simply cannot apply a universal test because:
A judge asked to apply the Rochin test will know of sadistic serial
killers like Leonard Lake and John Wayne Gacy, will remember the
Zapruder film and the photo of a Vietnamese girl consumed by
napalm. We live, for better or worse, "with a callous heart." Much
that has lost the power to outrage or to shock should be outlawed
nonetheless.141
Inconsistent application of the "shocking to the conscience" type of
defense threatens its continued viability.
2. Situations Where the Government Essentially Manufactured the
Crime
Another instance where courts find outrageous government con-
duct arises when the government essentially creates a crime in order
to punish its participants. 42 Though decided before Russell, Greene v.
United States 43 is an example of a federal court holding that a particu-
lar government action violated due process because it essentially man-
ufactured a crime. 44 In Greene, a federal agent approached the
defendant and asked him to establish a distillery for the illegal produc-
tion of liquor.' 45  In furtherance of this goal, the agent supplied
Greene with the still, the still site, as well as various ingredients
needed in the production of liquor, including 2000 pounds of sugar.' 46
The operation was maintained for over two and one half years and
139. See United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring) (explaining how some sting operations do not bother him but "[o]ther judges are offended
by immorality (such as sponsoring an informant's use of sexual favors as currency) or by acts that
endanger informants (such as supplying them with drugs for personal use) but not by the tradi-
tional sting").
140. Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process
Test Should Replace Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 261, 271-72
(1993). Professor Dripps advocated eliminating the outrageous government conduct defense
and replacing it with a broader Terry type rule to regulate the government agents' actions. Id. at
261. This rule would require government agents to have a "reasonable justification" for any
investigative methods "that 'deprive' individuals of their 'liberty.' " Id. at 262.
141. Id. at 271 (citation omitted).
142. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 498 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that in Hampton's case the government agents did nothing more than "buy contraband from
itself and jail the intermediary").
143. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
144. Id. at 787.
145. Id. at 784.
146. Id. at 785-86.
[Vol. 45:943
OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
during that time the government was the only customer of the opera-
tion.147 The Ninth Circuit held this conduct to be outrageous because
there would have been no crime had it not been for the extensive
efforts of the government agents in trying to obtain a conviction. 148
The court felt that "when the Government permits itself to become
enmeshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end," to the degree
that it had done in Greene, a conviction of the defendant would be
"repugnant to American criminal justice."'1 49 However, such a situa-
tion is rare. In a later case, the Ninth Circuit warned that such gov-
ernment involvement must lead to an actual, complete, and long-
functioning criminal apparatus wholly induced by the government. 150
This too is rare. It is more often the case that the government agents
will suggest a criminal scheme and let it develop, or will enter the
scheme once it has begun.' 5'
Many degrees of government involvement in crime have been de-
termined not to be outrageous. For example, in United States v. Ci-
tro152 the Ninth Circuit held that an undercover agent's conduct that
proposed and explained the details of a counterfeit credit card scheme
to the defendant, supplied him with the cards, and arrested him when
he used them, did not constitute outrageous government conduct. 153
Government agents have also been allowed to misrepresent them-
selves as agents of fictitious corporations to illicit bribes to public offi-
cials in order to obtain bribery convictions.' 54 In addition, courts have
held that agents may infiltrate ongoing criminal activities, 155 as well as
induce defendants to repeat or continue crime, or to expand their pre-
vious criminal activity.'5 6 Hampton illustrated that the government
agency may both supply the illegal contraband and purchase it in or-
der to obtain a conviction from the defendant. 57 These cases demon-
strate that while extreme government involvement such as the active
participation of agents in Greene may occur, it is more likely that con-
147. Id. at 785.
148. Id. at 787. The court stated "we do not believe the Government may involve itself so
directly and continuously over such a long period of time in the creation and maintenance of
criminal operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators." Id.
149. Id.
150. United States v. Lutrell, 889 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1989).
151. United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 911-12 (10th Cir. 1992).
152. 842 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1987).
153. Id. at 1153.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1981).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 877 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1989).
156. See, eg., Mosley, 965 F.2d at 911 (citing United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1468-69
n.3 (10th Cir. 1986)).
157. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976).
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duct short of intensive government involvement will survive an allega-
tion of outrageous conduct.
3. Government Conduct That Violates Principles of Fundamental
Fairness
The last category courts use when considering outrageous govern-
ment conduct is activity that violates concepts of fundamental fairness
found inherently in the Bill of Rights. 158 The doctrine of fundamental
fairness relies on the notion that criminal investigations should move
"deliberately, purposely and fairly.' 5 9 This doctrine has its origins in
Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.160 He
stated that the Constitution contains "the right to be left alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.' 16' While these rights might be the most fundamental and most
strongly defended, 62 they are still the most vague.
Two decisions have given the fundamental fairness claim some
merit. In United States v. Twigg,163 the Third Circuit recognized that
government conduct could be adjudged outrageous on the basis of vi-
olations of fundamental fairness. 164 The defendant in Twigg had been
recruited into a manufacturing operation for methamphetamine hy-
drochloride ("speed"). 65 The agents supplied all the chemicals and
all the expertise. 66 Twigg's primary function was to run errands for
groceries and coffee, contributing little to the actual operation. 67 The
court held that a conviction in this instance would violate fundamental
rules of fairness. 168 Moreover, the court held that the facts of Twigg
158. See United States v. Lutrell, 889 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[r]ooted in
the Bill of Rights is a concept that processes of criminal investigation move . . . fairly"). As
support, the court cited the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and Justice
Brandeis' famous dissent stating that the Constitution contains "the right to be left alone." Id.
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
162. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 471-72 (arguing that the outrageous government conduct
defense must be continued because it protects individuals' rights to fundamental concepts of
honesty and fair play).
163. 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978).
164. Id. at 374-75.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 375-76.
167. Id. at 376.
168. Id. at 381. The court continued:
[T]he DEA agents deceptively implanted the criminal design in Neville's mind. They
set him up, encouraged him, provided the essential supplies and technical expertise,
and when he and Kubica encountered difficulties in consummating the crime, they as-
sisted in finding solutions. This egregious conduct on the part of.government agents
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were distinguishable from Russell and Hampton;169 thus, the majority
in Twigg overturned a conviction based on outrageous government
conduct for the first time since its inception in Russell.
The concept of fundamental fairness was extended to the right to
not be investigated without just cause in United States v. Lutrell.170 In
Lutrell, the Ninth Circuit held that government agents must have
"reasoned grounds ... [to] approach apparently innocent individuals
and provide them with a specific opportunity to engage in criminal
conduct.' 71 Apparently, this significant step towards an extended
due process standard was later rejected by the Ninth Circuit in an en
banc hearing.172 With only a single dissenting opinion from Judge
Pregerson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the "reasoned
grounds" requirement for investigating an individual under the due
process clause. 173 Even before the later rejection, this original exten-
sion of the outrageous government conduct defense had its limita-
tions. Furthermore, the government can easily support its
investigation with a factual basis, and thus, the Lutrell standard is not
as demanding as it appears. 174 As a result of the Twigg holding and
the original Lutrell extension, the concepts of fundamental fairness
have gained the most support 75 of the three categories considered for
outrageous government conduct.
generated new crimes by the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges
against him when, as far as the record reveals, he was lawfully and peacefully minding
his own affairs. Fundamental fairness does not permit us to countenance such actions
by law enforcement officials and prosecution for a crime so fomented by them will be
barred.
Id.
169. The court distinguished Twigg from Russell because in Twigg the defendants were not
active participants in an illegal drug manufacturing enterprise which existed before the govern-
ment agent appeared on the scene. Id. at 378. Twigg was distinguished from Hampton because
the crime was "conceived and contrived by the government agents" in Twigg and not in Hamp-
ton. Id. at 378-79.
170. 889 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 813.
172. United States v. Lutrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
173. Id.
174. Marcus, supra note 1, at 471. Professor Marcus warns that the Lutrell holding is limited,
and that the government agents who can show this factual basis will prevail. He continued:
Thus, the case says little about broad concepts of shocking behavior and the involve-
ment of the due process clause generally in the entrapment area. Lutrell does, how-
ever, strike a significant blow on behalf of those who would encourage courts to take a
tough look at intense undercover operations based on minimal information concerning
particular individuals.
Id.
175. While Twigg has been criticized and the Lutrell "reasonable grounds" extension was va-
cated, these holdings were the most receptive to the due process defense.
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F. Policy Considerations Behind Outrageous Government Conduct
The confusion behind the outrageous government conduct defense
is a result of its inconsistent application. This inconsistent application
is due to the fact that different judges have different opinions as to the
state of the law and the means by which justice should be em-
ployed. 176 Judges have different opinions because of the various un-
derlying policy reasons that bear on the defense. These various policy
considerations are as diverse as the opinions they influence. The de-
fense was created to strike a balance between the societal need for
police investigation and as Justice Brandeis termed it, the "right to be
left alone."'1 77
Another policy reason for the defense was not to protect the indi-
vidual, but as Justice Roberts stated in his concurrence in Sorrells, to
protect and preserve the purity of otur government's functions. 178 Jus-
tice Frankfurter echoed this sentiment in his Sherman concurrence. 179
He stated that the public relies on the fair and honorable administra-
tion of justice, with this reliance ultimately lying on the rule of law.' 80
The individual and the system are therefore protected through the due
process standards. 18' Not only can the individual feel his "right to be
left alone" will be protected, but also law enforcement agents can re-
ceive guidance as to what behavior will be deemed unacceptable. 182
This guidance to the law enforcement community has been invaluable
in justifying the due process defense. 83
It is clear that courts balance these policy interests with the govern-
ment's need to combat crime and preserve an ordered society. While
the objective test by its name, indicates that courts should not let pol-
icy considerations taint their decisions, often this is not the case. Usu-
ally, the first factor taken into consideration by the court in making a
176. Compare United States v. TWigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (invalidating a conviction
pursuant to the due process defense) with United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that government did not engage in outrageous conduct by employing informant on a
contingent fee basis); see also, Greaney, supra note 133 (discussing a critical analysis of the due
process defense which explores the inconsistent application of the doctrine).
177. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
178. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 434, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
179. United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 381.
183. See Greaney, supra note 133, at 780-85 (advocating the need for the due process defense
in order to provide a sufficient check on police behavior); see also United States v. Barger, 931
F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1991) (listing "the need for the police conduct as shown by the type of
criminal activity involved" as the first of four factors to be considered for outrageous govern-
ment conduct).
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due process determination is the type of crime committed by the de-
fendant.184 This shows that when the crime is particularly unwanted
in a progressive society, the court will grant the police greater defer-
ence in their attempts to ferret out this societal wrong.185 In United
States v. West, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the type of
crime committed has enormous bearing on how government conduct
will be reviewed. 186 This illustrates that while there is an objective
due process standard by name, these principles can be stretched when
the criminal activity is of an unsavory kind.
One critic of the outrageous government conduct defense is Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit. In his concurring opinion in
United States v. Miller,187 Judge Easterbrook advocated the abolition
of the defense. 188 He felt that judges use no real guidelines.1 89 In-
stead, when they make important judicial decisions, they vote "with
their lower intestines."1 90 He argued that the defense had been so
unsuccessful because most judges agreed with the underlying policy
that "when push comes to shove, we should reject the contention that
the criminal must go free because the constable was too zealous."' 9'
Judge Easterbrook offered two reasons why the due process de-
fense should be abolished: 1) it raises false hopes for the defendant;' 92
and 2) the defense is useless because it fails to give the police any
guidance and because the courts can not agree on how to apply it.193
He suggests that the legislature would be a more appropriate forum in
which to resolve the problem. 94 By engaging in "outrageous" con-
duct, the police are going against moral standards. 95 If this is the
184. See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3rd Cir. 1974) (indicating that the
type of crime committed bears on how the government conduct will be reviewed).
185. Greaney, supra note 133, at 775. The author states:
Moreover, the fact that the court began its analysis in Twigg by asserting that the type
of crime being combated must be considered when analyzing a due process claim re-
vealed that the Third Circuit was willing to let social policy considerations override
faithfulness to the constitutional mandate of due process.
Id.
186. 511 F.2d at 1085.
187. 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1989)
188. Id. at 1271-72 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 1272-73.
190. Id. at 1273. In response to judges' efforts to determine what actually constitutes a due
process violation, Judge Easterbrook stated, "any line we draw would be unprincipled and there-
fore not judicial in nature . . . [m]ore likely there would be no line . . . [s]uch meandering,
personal approach is the antithesis of justice under law, and we ought not indulge it." Id.




195. Id. at 1273.
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case, Judge Easterbrook felt this is a political problem to be addressed
by Congress, not a problem to be handled by the courts.196 Judge Eas-
terbrook would defer the entire outrageous government conduct issue
to Congress. 197
While the extreme solution offered by Judge Easterbrook is becom-
ing a stronger possibility, there is much more authority and court
opinion against such a view.198 Professor Paul Marcus, an authority
on the entrapment/due process doctrine, 99gives a critical account of
Judge Easterbrook's concurring opinion in Miller.200 He argues that
Judge Easterbrook's first contention, namely that the defense gives
false hopes, is simply not true.20' Observing that it would be hard to
imagine many lawyers who look at a handful of successes in over two
hundred tries as being too hopeful, he suggests that those invoking the
defense know the odds, and have no false hopes. 202 Professor Marcus
196. Id. at 1271. Judge Easterbrook demonstrated his stance on crime, and his opinion on
how the decision should have come out with the following comments:
As [Miller] committed the crime, he should stand convicted. If the investigators were
too creative or squandered their limited resources, this is a political problem. Congress
can hold oversight hearings or pass a law; we shouldn't apply a chancellor's foot veto.
Dissipating law enforcement resources injures persons who become victims of crime
when the deterrent force of the law declines. Reversing convictions of the guilty cannot
apply balm to these wounds.
Id.
197. ld.
198. See United States v. Tbcker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1426
(1995) (heeding to Judge Easterbrook's recommendations to abolish the viability of the outra-
geous government conduct defense in the Sixth Circuit). But see United States v. Santana, 6
F.3d 1, 4 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992) (terming outrageous government conduct defense "moribund," but
declaring that Judge Easterbrook stretches the military analogy too far, preferring more neutral
language, and recommending the continued viability of the due process defense); United States
v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing the absolute viability of the outrageous
government conduct defense in ten federal circuits); Marcus, supra note 1 (encouraging the via-
bility and expansion of the due process doctrine).
199. See PAUL MARCUS, Tim ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (1989) (providing a comprehensive re-
view of the historical development of entrapment); Paul Marcus, Toward an Expanding View of
the Due Process Claim in Entrapment Cases, 6 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 73 (1989) (proposing an
expanded application of due process to prove overinvolvement by law enforcement officials);
Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the Predisposition Test, 14 AM. J. CRiM. L. 53 (1987)
(analyzing procedural issues involved in proving entrapment under the federal standard); Paul
Marcus, The Entrapment Defense and Procedural Issues: Burden of Proof, Questions of Law and
Fact, and Inconsistent Defenses, 22 CriM. L. BULL. 197 (1986) (analyzing the burden of proof and
role of the judge and jury in entrapment cases); Paul Marcus, The Development of Entrapment
Law, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 5 (1986) (reviewing the historical background and development of
entrapment law).
200. Marcus, supra note 1, at 465-66.
201. Id. at 465.
202. Id. In response to the false hopes claim, Professor Marcus states:
To state the proposition in this rather flip fashion, however, is to demonstrate its weak-
ness. As a preliminary matter, one must question whether any defendant or defense
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concludes that the likelihood of failure is no reason to abandon an
important defense.20 3
Marcus also rejects Judge Easterbrook's second contention, that the
courts can never agree on conditions for the defense, and therefore,
police receive no guidance.2° With the defense intact, there is always
a threat to police officers that their actions may be deemed outra-
geous.205 Marcus argues that all courts would agree that actions such
as those used in Judge Friendly's example in Archer and the behavior
in Isaacson would be seen as outrageous and violative of the defend-
ant's due process.20 6 While the defense is not universally applied, he
feels this is no reason to abolish a viable check on massive govern-
mental power.207
G. Sixth Circuit Attempts to Define Outrageous
Government Conduct
The Sixth Circuit has faced many of the same problems that have
plagued other federal circuits. The first case dealing with the outra-
geous government conduct defense heard by the court was United
States v. Leja.208 In Leja, the court acknowledged that extreme egre-
gious conduct by government agents could offend concepts of funda-
mental fairness to justify the rare use of judicial power to stop it.209
However, the court found that the government conduct in Leja's in-
stance was not of this type.210 Noting that courts should not automati-
cally reject the due process defense when predisposition is found, the
court seems to mix the predisposition and the objective outrageous
government conduct tests.21' The court stated that when the defend-
ant has the requisite predisposition to defeat an entrapment defense,
attorney raising a due process claim can seriously harbor false hopes. All lawyers in
this area, both prosecution and defense, know that few cases successfully put forth the
due process argument. To suggest that defendants and lawyers should not have false




205. People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978).
206. Marcus, supra note 1, at 465-66; see Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82-83 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that extreme physical abuse is outrageous government conduct).
207. Id.
208. 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1977).
209. Id. at 246.
210. Id. at 247.
211. Id. See Rhonda E. Stringer, The Due Process Defense in "Reverse Sting" Cases: When
Do Police Overstep the Bounds of Permissible Police Conduct?, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1305, 1318-
19 (1993) (stating that the court used "the fact that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crimes charged," as part of the rationale in rejecting the due process defense claim).
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the conduct would have to be taken to a "constitutional magni-
tude. '212 The Leja court stated if government action rises to a consti-
tutional magnitude, the outrageous government conduct defense
should be applied. 213 However, the Leja court did nothing to state
what behavior constitutes such a magnitude.
The Sixth Circuit has never overturned a conviction on outrageous
government conduct grounds, but by 1992 it had applied the due pro-
cess defense several times,214 and established a test to be used by the
courts for a due process determination. This test consists of four fac-
tors for determining a due process violation by the government, and is
outlined in United States v. Barger.21 5 The factors considered are: 1)
the need for the police conduct as shown by the type of criminal activ-
ity involved, 2) the impetus for the scheme or whether the criminal
enterprise preexisted the police involvement, 3) the control the gov-
ernment exerted over the criminal enterprise, and 4) the impact of the
police activity on the commission of the crime. 216 These factors are
considered by the court and are not mandatory prongs in a test.217
The standard used by the Sixth Circuit courts is in the form of tradi-
tional outrageous government conduct language; that government
conduct must violate fundamental fairness and be shocking to the uni-
versal sense of justice to violate concepts of due process.218 While the
Sixth Circuit has never overturned a conviction on this basis, it is clear
212. Leja, 563 F.2d at 247. The court stated, "[i]f the egregious conduct of implanting an
unlawful motive in an innocent mind does not rise to constitutional magnitude, it is difficult
indeed to prohibit on constitutional grounds the prosecution of the defendants on these facts,
where they were clearly predisposed to commit the acts." Id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that an under-
cover IRS agent's conduct of posing as a drug dealer trying to launder money and providing the
defendant with money was not outrageous under a four factor test); United States v. Qaoud, 777
F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985) (ruling that the government's actions were neither shocking nor such
an unwarranted interference that the court should set aside the verdicts of the district court);
United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that a government agent did not
violate any of the factors of a four part test in infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan to obtain criminal
bombing convictions from the defendant); United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980)
(establishing a four factor test to be considered in a due process claim, and determining that the
government action did not meet the standard necessary for outrageousness).
215. 931 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1990).
216. Id. at 363.
217. Id. In Barger, the court failed to find an outrageous government conduct violation where
the agent infiltrated the Hell's Angels biker gang to expose a murder plot against a rival biker
gang. Id. It ruled the defendant was ready and willing to go along with the plot and such gov-
ernment action was necessary considering the violent nature of the organization. Id.
218. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)).
1996] OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT 969
that a test for outrageous government conduct had been consistently
applied.219 However, all this changed in United States v. Tucker.
II. SUBJECT OPINION: UNITED STA TES v. TUCKER
In United States v. Tucker,220 the claim of outrageous government
conduct is raised as a result of a "reverse sting" 221 operation initiated
by the United States Department of Agriculture.222 In an effort to
"catch .. .a lot of people that had been abusing the [food stamp]
system, '223 the Department hired Linda Hancock to find people will-
ing to buy the stamps below face value and to record the transac-
tions.224 For her efforts, Hancock worked on a commission basis,
keeping half of the money she collected from her customers.225
Two of Hancock's customers were the defendants, Brenda Tucker
and Barbara McDonald. 226 In November of 1990, Hancock called
Tucker, who had been a friend of hers for ten years, to inquire if she
was interested in purchasing food stamps. 227 Hancock stated that she
was selling the stamps in order to raise much needed money to give
her children a "proper Christmas. '228 Tucker resisted at first but later
agreed to buy the stamps when she saw Hancock at a beauty salon
dressed in a manner representative of her grave financial situation.229
Hancock then asked Tucker if she knew of anyone else that might be
interested in purchasing food stamps, and Tucker supplied her with
the name of one of her employees, McDonald.230 McDonald also
219. See supra note 214 (listing various Sixth Circuit decisions which contain a full outrageous
government conduct analysis). The Sixth Circuit has continued to engage in a due process analy-
sis even after the Tucker holding. In United States v. Zaia, No. 93-1452, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
24346, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1252 (1995), the Sixth Circuit analyzed
the credibility of the particular defendant's due process claim. Id. While finding against the
defendant, a due process analysis was nonetheless undertaken. Id. See infra notes 350-52 and
accompanying text (discussing the Zaia holding in context with the impact of the Tucker
holding).
220. 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct 1426 (1995).
221. A reverse sting is most often used by narcotics agents in attempting to obtain convictions
for narcotics offenses. Greaney, supra note 133, at 747. In a reverse sting, the government agent
attempts to sell drugs or other controlled substances to the defendants, arresting them after they
have purchased the illegal narcotics. Id. Instead of drugs, the illegal purchase in Tucker was











purchased food stamps from Hancock after listening to her stories of
ill-health and financial need.231 Tucker and McDonald were then ar-
rested for purchasing, and aiding and abetting the purchase of, food
stamps.232
A. The District Court's Ruling
The case was referred to a magistrate for evidentiary hearings, find-
ings, and recommendations. 233 The magistrate recommended dismis-
sal.234 The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
agreed.235 Judge Jerome Turner held that the government should not
"lower itself" into targeting sympathetic ploys on citizens that are not
otherwise suspected of engaging in criminal conduct. 236 This, along
with a totality of the factors approach, led the district court to dismiss
the indictment because the government conduct was outrageous.237
B. The Sixth Circuit's Ruling
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court,
overturned the dismissal, and remanded the case for trial.238 The
court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the history of the outrageous
government conduct defense. 239 The court stated that while the door
to the "objective" defense was left open after the Hampton decision,
this precedent had questionable value.240 According to the court, the
concurrences by Justices Powell and Blackmun upholding the possibil-
ity of the defense are questionable because they rely on dicta.241 The
court also noted that Justice Rhenquist's passage creating the defense
231. Id.
232. Id. The violation is listed under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1994).
233. Thcker, 28 F.3d at 1421. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that
the government's conduct in inducing defendants to commit their crimes was so "outrageous"




237. Id. In response to all of the government agent's actions, the district court concluded:
[C]ertainly there is no reason why the government cannot use undercover agents, can-
not pay those undercover agents, cannot have undercover agents deal with friends, can-
not use untrue ploys. All of those things individually are certainly useful techniques for
investigation. But when they are employed in totality with people who are not other-
wise suspected of engaging in crime, it seems to me that the conduct, as the Magistrate
concluded, crosses (the constitutional] boundary.
Id.
238. Id. at 1428-29.
239. Id. at 1422-26.
240. Id. at 1426.
241. Id. at 1423.
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in Russell relied on dicta.242 Consequently, the court held that there
was no substantial precedent created by the Supreme Court to war-
rant an outrageous government conduct defense.243
The court then explored the Sixth Circuit precedent for such a via-
ble defense. While discussing Leja,244 and four other cases when ana-
lyzing the defense,245 the court held that there was "no authority in
this circuit which holds that the government's conduct in inducing the
commission of a crime, if 'outrageous' enough, can bar prosecution of
an otherwise predisposed defendant under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment." 246 The court stated that while the defense has
been analyzed, courts have done nothing more than "assume" the
existence of such a defense, while holding that it "would not apply
under the present facts. '247 The Tucker court found no precedent sup-
porting the defense in the Sixth Circuit, and held that "the legal exist-
ence of the defendants' asserted 'due process' defense is an open
question." 248
Next, the court reviewed judicial authority from other federal cir-
cuits. In light of the lack of precedent 249 and the questions concerning
the constitutionality of a due process defense,250 the court found no
persuasive authority to guide the matter.25' Therefore, given the state
of the law, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that no de-
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1426. The court stated:
In sum, there is no binding Supreme Court authority recognizing a defense based solely
upon an objective assessment of the government's conduct in inducing the commission
of crimes. Nonbinding dicta of the Court, indicating that there may be such a defense,
has been recanted by its author ....
Id.
244. Id. at 1424 (citing United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1977)).
245. Id. (citing United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Qaoud,
777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1424-25.
248. Id. at 1425.
249. The court did not regard Twigg as authority on this case because it felt that the Third
Circuit had improperly relied on United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1975), which had
been limited by Hampton and other more recent Third Circuit opinions such as United States v.
Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 12 (3rd Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (19§2)). Tucker, 28
F.3d at 1426.
250. Id. (citing United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991)). The court
suggested that when defendants raise the due process defense, it is the "wrong" which is illusory
and the "remedy" sought which is unconstitutional. Id.
251. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
fense existed.252 The court based this reasoning on three premises: 1)
government conduct, even if labeled "outrageous, does not violate the
defendant's constitutional right of due process", 2) because no viola-
tion of another constitutionally protected right was shown, the District
Court lacked authority to dismiss the indictment, and 3) "the contin-
ued recognition of this defense" invites violation of the constitutional
separation of powers.253
The court pointed to a logical inconsistency inherent in the defense
as evidence of how inducement by the government does not violate
due process.254 Referring to defendants who use the due process de-
fense, the court confusingly stated:
They argue that it would be "fundamentally unfair" to convict them
of a crime, even assuming that they were predisposed to commit
that crime, because of the outrageous conduct of the government in
inducing their actions. As noted above, however, the Supreme
Court has held that the basis for the entrapment defense lies in con-
gressional intent and, specifically, not in the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. From this it must certainly follow that, if
Congress were to reject entrapment as a defense, even defendants
who were induced to commit a crime and who were not predisposed
could be convicted without violating due process. If due process is
not offended by convicting those who are not predisposed, a priori it
is not offended by convicting those who are predisposed. 255
The court noted that Justice Rhenquist attempted to eliminate this
inconsistency in Hampton when he found that the only defense avail-
able to defendants was that of entrapment. 256
Next, the court, relying principally on United States v. Payner, held
that because there was no constitutional violation, the District Court
had no authority to dismiss an indictment.257 In Payner, the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule represented
a balancing of competing interests, "the interest of society in convict-
ing criminals" and the interest of protecting individuals' rights.258
"This balance... was not subject to a case-by-case second-guessing by
the lower courts in the guise of exercising their supervisory power. '259
A due process challenge could similarly not be successful because the
252. Id. at 1426-27. The court held that "based on the lack of binding precedent from either
the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit, we are of the view that this panel is not required to
recognize the 'due process' defense." Id.
253. Id. at 1427.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citations omitted).
256. Id. (citing Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
257. Id. (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980)).
258. Id. (citing Payner, 447 U.S. at 733).
259. Id.
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fact remains that "the limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come
into play only when the government activity in question violates some
protected right of the defendant. '260 In this case, the defendants did
not show a protected right. Therefore, the Tucker court ruled that the
district court overstepped the limits of judicial power by dismissing
the indictments. 261
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the due process defense vio-
lated the constitutional separation of powers. 262 The court stated that
the "executive branch is responsible for, and answerable to the electo-
rate . . .," for its actions.263 Thus, the court reasoned that it is not for
the judiciary to determine what government action is "outrageous"
enough to be intolerable under due process principles.264 The court
relied on Jacobson v. United States, 265 which stated the only time in
which a conviction can be overturned is when the subjective predispo-
sition is not met.266 Because this line is not to be circumvented on an
ad hoc basis, the court held that predisposition analysis is the only one
authorized by the Constitution.267 Moreover, any other analysis, such
as the objective due process test engaged in by the district court in
Tucker, is violative of the separation of powers. 268 For these three
reasons, the Court of Appeals held that "a defendant whose defense
sounds in inducement is, by congressional intent and Supreme Court
precedent, limited to the defense of entrapment and its key element of
predisposition." 269
C. Judge Martin's Concurrence
Circuit Judge Martin concurred in the result, but disagreed with the
majority on the viability of the outrageous government conduct de-
fense.270 Judge Martin agreed that the case should be remanded for
trial, but only because the government action in Tucker was not suffi-
ciently "outrageous" to raise a successful due process claim.271 He
260. Id. at 1427-28 (citing Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490).
261. Id. at 1428.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. The court stated that the predisposition standard established in Sorrells, is not "sub-
ject to circumvention on a case-by-case basis. The mere invocation of the phrase 'due process'
does not give the courts license to conduct its own 'oversight' of police practices." Id.





270. Id. at 1429.
271. Id. at 1430.
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did, however, feel that there is sufficient established Supreme Court
and Sixth Circuit authority to conduct a thorough due process analy-
sis.272 He pointed to the Sixth Circuit's Barger decision where a thor-
ough due process analysis was done and a four factor test was
outlined.2 73 Thus, in light of this established precedent, Judge Martin
felt the panel was bound to prior Sixth Circuit authority recognizing
the existence of the outrageous government conduct defense under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.274
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TUCKER HOLDING
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Tucker is flawed in
several distinct ways. First, contrary to stare decisis, the court incor-
rectly finds that it is not bound by Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit
authority.275 Secondly, all three propositions presented by the court
for justifying its holding misinterpret the history and state of the out-
rageous government conduct defense. Lastly, if these mistaken justifi-
cations are adhered to by the courts, the result would be to do away
with the due process defense; which would be an affront to the policy
of providing a much needed check on overzealous law enforcement
agents.
A. Precedent Must Be Followed
The Court of Appeals incorrectly stated that there was no prece-
dential value left from the Hampton decision.276 In Hampton, a five
to three majority decision, the Supreme Court held that an objective
due process defense was available to defendants in situations where
the government conduct was found "outrageous. '277 In his concur-
rence, Justice Powell, joined by three dissenting justices, found viabil-
272. Id. at 1429-30. He continued, "[i]t seems clear to me that this Circuit has recognized
outrageous government conduct as a valid due process defense, and, as the majority concedes,
the Supreme Court has not clearly held otherwise." Id.
273. Id. at 1429. Referring to both the Barger and Payne decisions, Judge Martin continued,
"[t]his analysis was undertaken, in both instances, in a separate section of the opinion devoted
solely to the briefed and argued issue of outrageous government conduct, and not simply in a
passing statement or cursory, superfluous commentary." Id.
274. Id. at 1429-30.
275. Stare decisis is a doctrine that establishes the value of precedent, and the necessity for the
courts to "abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed.
1990).
276. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1423-24. The court referred to a "clear" statement that rejects the
objective standard. Id. But this clear statement is simply Justice Rhenquist quoting his plurality
opinion in Hampton. Id. On this issue, the opinion failed to gain a majority. Id.
277. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ity of the defense undeniable. 278 He stated "I am unwilling to
conclude that an analysis other than one limited to predisposition
would never be appropriate under due process principles. 2 79 A care-
ful reading through the double negative will show that Hampton is
strong precedent for the existence of the due process/outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense.
The Tucker court felt free to disregard Hampton because both Jus-
tice Rhenquist's language in Russell and Justice Powell's language in
Hampton were what it termed "[n]onbinding dicta. '280 This is an un-
warranted rejection of Supreme Court precedent. Even if the lan-
guage is technically dictum, "this carefully considered language of the
Supreme Court generally must be treated as authoritative."
2 8 1
Whether dicta or not, the Supreme Court precedent should not have
been denied.
More importantly, the court is bound by prior Sixth Circuit deci-
sions confirming the viability of the due process defense. One panel
of the Sixth Circuit cannot overrule an opinion of another panel.
282
As Judge Martin's Tucker concurrence stated, there is a long line of
accepted cases that thoroughly analyzed the defense.2 83 He correctly
noted that in two Sixth Circuit cases,284 there were separate sections
of the opinions "devoted solely to the briefed and argued issue of out-
rageous government conduct, and not simply in a passing statement or
cursory, superfluous commentary. ' '285 The majority opinion charac-
terized the prior Sixth Circuit authority as dicta because in every case
in which the issue had been raised, the government conduct was held
to be "outrageous. '286 While it is true that an outrageous government
278. Id. at 492, 497 (Powell, J., concurring).
279. Id. at 493.
280. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1424.
281. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 1426 (1995) (citing Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856,
861 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993)).
282. See United States v. Edge, 989 F.2d 871, 876 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that requisite bad
faith would substantiate a due process claim and that it may be used if the case is "exceptional"
or if refusing to consider it would result in a great injustice).
283. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1429 (Martin, C.J., concurring).
284. United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d
359 (6th Cir. 1991).
285. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1428 (Martin, C.J., concurring).
286. Id. at 1426. The Tucker majority held:
Moreover, this court has recognized the availability of this defense only in dicta be-
cause, in every case in which the issue has been raised, the government's conduct has
been held not to have been "outrageous." The only case squarely holding that an ob-
jective assessment of the government's conduct in a particular case may bar prosecu-
tion without regard for the defendant's predisposition [Twigg] has been greatly
criticized, often distinguished, and recently, disavowed in its own circuit.
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conduct defense has never been successful in the Sixth Circuit, this
does not mean that the defense does not exist. The Tucker court in-
correctly views the failure of a due process claim as the basis of the
extinction of the defense. While the defense claim has consistently
failed, the Sixth Circuit has always given the due process defense care-
ful consideration. In fact, the defense has held great weight in the
circuit, and a four factor test was created in United States v. Barger.2 87
The Tucker court was bound by precedent, and should have applied
the Barger four factor test to determine if outrageous government
conduct violated the defendants' due process rights.
B. The Court's Justifications are Flawed
While the Tucker court erred in failing to give the Hampton deci-
sion precedent, its holding is also incorrect because each of its three
justifications for the elimination of the defense are flawed. In Tucker,
the Sixth Circuit incorrectly stated that government action can never
violate due process, that the courts have no authority to dismiss an
indictment under due process, and that such an attempt by the court
violates the constitutionally mandated separation of powers.288 None
of these claims can be supported by case law, nor by the principles of
the Due Process Clause.
1. The Majority's Claim that Inducement can Never Violate Due
Process
After finding no precedential value in the sixty years of decisions
since the inception of the due process defense in Sorrells, the Sixth
Circuit analyzed the prospect of a due process defense as if it were a
clean slate.289 It first found that no government inducement of a de-
fendant could ever violate that defendant's due process rights.29° The
court pointed out a "logic inconsistency" in a due process defendant's
Id. But see Appellant/Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Rehearing, at 4 n.1, United
States v. bcker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-6028).
Contrary to the majority opinion in this case, Santana doesn't "ridicule" this doctrine.
Judge Selya, in a quite erudite opinion on the subject, stated that a majority of the
Supreme Court in Hampton had "vivif(ied) the doctrine of outrageous conduct,"...
and in a postscript indicated that the doctrine, despite its restrictions, could be used to
prevent "the government from going too far."
Id. (citing United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 3 n.4, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)).
287. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1991).
288. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1427-28.
289. Id. at 1426-27. The court held that "based on the lack of binding precedent from either
the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit, we are of the view that this panel is not required to
recognize the 'due process' defense." Id.
290. Id. at 1427.
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claim as support.291 To illustrate this apparent inconsistency, the court
posed a hypothetical situation of what would result if Congress were
to repeal the entrapment defense.292 With the elimination of entrap-
ment, the court asked how a predisposed defendant could find a de-
fense in the due process clause, where a non-predisposed (assumedly
more innocent) defendant would have no defense, and therefore be
guilty under law. 293 The court's reasoning in this hypothetical situa-
tion is flawed for two reasons. Its first flaw is the circular and confus-
ing manner in which a simple doctrine is stated, and then attacked.
The court clearly does not agree with the due process defense, and
cloaks this disagreement in a complex and improper hypothetical
problem. The way the issue is framed by the court causes a simple
doctrine to sound like a logical inconsistency.
Secondly, and much more importantly, the court incorrectly decides
the result of its own hypothetical. The court is correct in stating that a
predisposed defendant would find a defense in the Due Process clause
if the government agents' actions were sufficiently outrageous. How-
ever, this defense could also be applied by a non-predisposed defend-
ant. The court attempted to show an injustice by stating that a
defendant with the sufficient predisposition would be let free while
one who lacked the criminal intent would be convicted. 294 This is not
the case. Due process does not distinguish predisposition from non-
predisposition. All citizens are protected by the fights of Due Process.
The Tucker court fell into the same trap as have many other federal
courts since the inception of the defense in Russell.295 It confused due
process principles with those of entrapment. The court displayed this
confusion by citing Justice Rhenquist's opinion in Russell stating that
the basis of the entrapment defense lies in congressional intent, and
specifically not in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.296
While this is a true statement of entrapment law, this statement has no
bearing upon an outrageous government conduct determination. The
two defenses are distinct from each other. They have separate histo-
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1427.
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding the government conduct
of riffling through a brief case was not a due process violation); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d
1265 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that government did not engage in outrageous conduct by employ-
ing an informant on a contingent fee basis); see also Greaney, supra note 133 (presenting a
critical analysis of the due process defense which explores the inconsistent application of the
doctrine).
296. United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1426
(1995) (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-31 (1973)).
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ries, bases, and applications. 297 Any mixing of the two defenses will
result in the unnecessary confusion found in the court's hypothetical.
The correct application of the defense hinges upon the government
agents' behavior, not upon a defendant's predisposition. If a trial
court determined the agents' activity to be "outrageous," due process
would ensure that a conviction could not be had by the prosecution.
Not only is such an analysis not a "logical inconsistency," in many
ways it is more logical and consistent than entrapment. Rather than
requiring the trier of fact to get into the mind of the defendant to
determine his predisposition, the judge may simply review the conduct
of the government agents. If such conduct is sufficiently "outra-
geous," there will be no conviction.
The Sixth Circuit further confused due process with entrapment
when it cited Justice Rhenquist's plurality opinion in Hampton for
support. 298 In that opinion, Justice Rhenquist rejected any due pro-
cess defense.299 As previously noted however, Justice Rhenquist's po-
sition on the due process defense failed to gain a majority. The
Hampton majority solidified the defense as one available to defend-
ants.300 This availability was denied to the Tucker defendants by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.30'
2. The Court's Authority To Dismiss the Indictment
For its second justification of why the due process defense "simply
should not exist," the court stated that the lower court had no author-
ity to dismiss the defendants' indictments.30 2 The court relied on
United States v. Payner for this proposition.303 It relied on Justice
Powell's proposition in Payner that lower courts are not to replace
explicit, clear-cut legal rules with ill-defined standards under the
"guise of exercising their supervisory powers. ' 304 However, Payner is
inapposite to cases of outrageous government conduct, such as that
exhibited in Tucker. The two cases deal with entirely different situa-
tions, types of defendants, and legal issues. Payner involved the appli-
297. See supra notes 121-175 and accompanying text (discussing the origins and tests needed
to prove the respective defenses).
298. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1427.
299. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976). In Hampton, Justice Rhenquist
stated that the basis for entrapment is an implied congressional intent and specifically not the
Due Process Clause. Id.
300. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Hampton holding).
301. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1427.
302. Id.
303. Id. (citing United States v. Payner, 477 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1980)).
304. Id. (citing Payner, 477 U.S. at 734).
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cation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in a situation
where the government conduct did not affect the rights of the defend-
ant.305 The Court stated that it will not allow lower courts to apply
their supervisory power to suppress otherwise good evidence just be-
cause it was unlawfully seized from a third party non-defendant. 30 6
In due process cases such as Tucker, the defendants are not third
parties to the action. They are the persons whose rights are infringed,
and whose lives are affected by a criminal conviction. This distinction
makes the Payner holding inapplicable to criminal defendants using
the due process defense. The holding of Payner applies to 1) search
and seizure exclusionary cases, and 2) third party non-defendants. 30 7
The Tucker case involves neither of these two Payner qualifications.
In Tucker, the defendant's rights were directly violated by the actions
of law enforcement authorities, and Payner should not control in any
manner.
As support for its repeal of the due process defense, the Tucker
court stated that Justice Powell's Payner holding "lays to rest whatever
modicum of Russell's dicta may have survived Hampton. '30 8 As al-
ready stated, Payner's holding involved issues not before the Court in
due process cases like RusselP0 9 and Hampton,310 and before the Sixth
Circuit in Tucker. The Sixth Circuit should not speculate as to how
the Supreme Court would have approached the due process defense if
it were addressed in Payner, and then use this speculation as authority
for the abolition of this established defense. The due process defense
was last brought before the Court in Hampton. In that case, the de-
fense gained a five to three majority,311 and until its abolishment by
another Supreme Court majority, speculation as to inapposite hold-
ings must not control lower courts' decisions.
3. Separation of Powers
For its third justification, the Sixth Circuit stated that the due pro-
cess defense violates the Constitutional separation of powers.312 The
court addressed the issue that underlies the entire outrageous govern-
ment conduct analysis: "What to do about this conduct and which
305. Payner, 477 U.S. at 732.
306. Id. at 735.
307. Id.
308. United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1428 (6th Cir. 1994) cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 1252
(1995).
309. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
310. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
311. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Hampton holding).
312. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1428.
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branch of the government should do it?"313 The court stated that this
is the duty of the legislature.314 With regard to inducement, it held
that Congress has implicitly curbed government actions by impliedly
intending in each statute that a conviction not be had against a de-
fendant who did not possess a requisite amount of predisposition. 315
This is the hidden intent of Congress' rationale so strongly criticized
by the concurrences in Sherman and Sorrells.316 The Tucker court
continued, because entrapment was created by Congress, the mere
mention of the phrase " 'due process' does not give the courts license
to conduct its own 'oversight' of police practices. '31 7
However, simply because a defense of entrapment was created "im-
pliedly" by Congress, it does not follow that there must not be a con-
stitutionally based due process defense as well. Again however,
entrapment and due process are distinct and do not rely on the exist-
ence of each other for life. More clearly, Hampton does give the
courts authority to rule on the "outrageousness" of police practices
regardless of any predisposition analysis.318 This authority has been
used by every circuit, including the Sixth Circuit, until the Tucker
decision.319
In this last justification section, the Tucker court demonstrated its
holding's fundamental problem. In explaining how authority to curb
government conduct is limited to Congress it stated: "[t]hus, a defend-
ant's subjective predisposition marks the point at which society's in-
terest in preventing governmental overreaching is outweighed by
society's interest in punishing those who commit crimes, not the objec-
tive character of the government's conduct. '320 This statement dem-
onstrates the Sixth Circuit's fundamental error that plagues its entire
analysis. The court continually denies the existence of the Hampton
majority's holding that a defense does exist that determines the pro-
priety of the objective character of the government's conduct. 32' The
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. (citing Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992)).
316. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text (discussing the hidden congressional intent
rationale).
317. United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1428 (6th Cir. 1994) cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 1252
(1995).
318. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 492, 497 (1976). The concurring opinions of
Justices Powell and Blackmun, joined by three dissenting justices on that issue, establish the
viability of a due process defense. Id.
319. See, e.g., United States v. Zaia, 35 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 1994) (continuing the use of the due
process defense in the Sixth Circuit even after the Tucker case).
320. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1428.
321. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-90.
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Tucker court continues to hold that one defense called entrapment
exists, while another defense called due process, does not. However,
the legal truth, as defined by the Supreme Court, is that both exist.
The Hampton majority did not hold that an objective analysis of the
government's conduct violates the constitutional separation of pow-
ers.322 It did not hold this because the Constitution gives the courts
the authority to ensure that "Due Process" is carried out. The Sixth
Circuit surely cannot find unconstitutional what the Supreme Court
found constitutional in Hampton.
4. Policy Considerations
The Tucker court erred by refusing to follow Supreme Court and
Sixth Circuit precedent, and by using flawed justifications in its abol-
ishment of the outrageous conduct defense. However, sound public
policy demands the retention of the defense. The first of these policy
considerations is an overwhelming need to give law enforcement of-
ficers guidance as to what type of behavior is unacceptable in a pro-
gressive society.323 Government agents must know that there is some
check on their behavior at the judicial level. The due process defense
accomplishes this task. The defense's value is in its creation of an
outer limit on appropriate law enforcement techniques. 324 It demon-
strates to the police community, and more importantly, to society at
large, that the courts will draw some line that cannot be crossed even
in the pursuit of criminals.325 While the defense succeeds only on rare
occasions, these successes have an impact. From the seminal due pro-
cess case in Rochin v. California326 to United States v. Twigg,327 the
courts have demonstrated that some behavior from the police will not
be tolerated. This is an important value of the defense.
Another value of the due process defense is that it bypasses some of
the problems found with entrapment. With the entrapment predispo-
sition analysis, the trier of fact is informed of the criminal background
322. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Hampton majority's
holding).
323. See Greaney, supra note 133 at 785-96 (discussing the need to monitor police officer's
behavior).
324. See id. at 745 (arguing that the very value of the due process defense is its influence over
law enforcement officers' behavior).
325. See Marcus, supra note 1 at 465 (comparing the beneficial effects of the due process
theory to that of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment). Professor Marcus states that
both are really not often successful, but their value is "important both to deter improper police
procedure and promote judicial integrity." Id. at 465 n.46.
326. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
327. 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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and unseemly associations of the defendant.32 8 This is allowed not as
impermissible character evidence, but as evidence of the state of mind
of the defendant - his predisposition/lack of predisposition.329 Most
juries are unable to distinguish such crucial evidence and only apply it
to the issue of whether the defendant intended to commit a crime.
Rather, most juries will use this evidence to assume, correctly or in-
correctly, that a person with such "bad character" must have wanted
to commit the crime charged. 330 Justice Stewart warned of this very
occurrence in his dissent in Russell.331 He stated that this evidence
could even include rumored criminal activities of the defendant that
were insufficient to obtain an indictment, and agents' suspicions about
the defendant.332 Not only is this evidence unreliable, it is also hear-
say.3 33 However, under entrapment, this prejudicial evidence is per-
mitted to determine the defendant's state of mind.
Not only does this evidence hurt the defendant in the courtroom, it
also creates an incentive for overzealous police officers to pursue
"shady" characters with more fervor. This concept was first stated by
Justice Roberts' concurrence in Sorrells,334 and later reiterated by Jus-
tice Stewart in Russell.335 Content with the knowledge that his actions
will be secondary to evidence of the defendant's past criminal behav-
ior or bad reputation, a government agent may go beyond his usual
tactics to obtain a conviction. This puts many defendants claiming en-
trapment closer to potential conviction simply because of their past.
328. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,443-45 (1973) (discussing the prejudicial effect
the use of character evidence of this nature may have on a defendant).
329. See id. (discussing again the negative impact the use of such evidence would have on a
defendant).
330. See Abramson & Lindeman, supra note 2, at 149 (stating that by pleading entrapment as
a defense, the defendant subjects himself to an inquest into his past behavior that would not
normally be permitted; the prejudice of such an "inquest" is seen by the authors to create more
of an injustice than any use of the due process clause by the defendant).
331. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
332. Id.
333. Id. This evidence would be hearsay because testimony would be allowed in court about
what various police officers and other typical prosecution witnesses heard about the defendant.
Id. The speakers of the statements would not be in court (only the hearers), and the testimony
would be presented to show that the defendant had a bad reputation, and most likely a criminal
disposition. Id. While this testimony is an out of court statement offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, thus hearsay, it would still be allowed in court to show that the defendant's state
of mind was such that he was most likely "predisposed." Id.
334. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that overreaching by the police is not condoned simply because the defendant has a prior
criminal record).
335. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443-48 ("Stated another way, this subjective test means that the gov-
ernment is permitted to entrap a person with a criminal record or bad reputation and then to
prosecute him for the manufactured crime, confident that he was predisposed to commit the
offense anyway.").
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As Justice Frankfurter stated: "[p]ermissible police activity does not
vary according to the particular defendant concerned.., one should
not go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and is said
to have a criminal disposition. ' 336
The due process defense avoids this injustice. This reason alone
should warrant its continued use. In engaging in a due process analy-
sis, the judge, as trier of law, not as trier of fact, looks only to the
actions of the government agents involved. 337 The state of mind of the
defendant is never a consideration in this analysis. As its name points
out, the defense allows for an "objective" interpretation of the gov-
ernment agents' behavior. The overzealous police officers who pump
a defendant's stomach searching for evidence, 338 or who supply the
defendant with a rare ingredient necessary for the illegal production
of methamphetamine, 339 have been found to reach this threshold level
of outrageousness. As the successful uses of the defense have shown,
there is a point at which the court can no longer condone the govern-
ment's "outrageous" behavior. The due process defense allows the
court to bar the type of abuse seen in Rochin and Twigg. The defense
must be retained to ensure the courts of this power.
IV. IMPACr OF THE TUCKER DECISION
The Tucker court's decision to deny defendants the due process de-
fense will have serious effects. First, it only continues to muddle a
confused and often ill-applied doctrine of law. By stating that the due
process defense does not exist, the Tucker court abolishes a constitu-
tional defense that had been raised hundreds of times since its incep-
tion in Russell. The Tucker holding has just recently been joined by
another federal circuit. The Seventh Circuit abolished the defense
through Chief Judge Posner's opinion in United States v. Boyd.340 In
three short sentences of analysis, and in a case that did not directly
deal with an outrageous government conduct claim, Judge Posner "let
the other shoe drop . . ." on the defense.341 In its brief analysis, the
Seventh Circuit expanded on the "moribund" characterization of the
due process defense by calling it "stillborn. ' 342 The court stated that
the defense "never had any life," and that the Seventh Circuit had
336. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
337. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
338. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).
339. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1978).
340. 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995).
341. Id.
342. Id. (citing United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993)).
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consistently gone out of its way to criticize the doctrine. 343 The court
continued this practice in Boyd by going out of its way to analyze the
defense where it was not raised by the defendants. 344
Judge Posner concluded that as far as the Seventh Circuit was con-
cerned, "the doctrine does not exist. '345 Where the Sixth Circuit had
spent an entire case, a case where the due process defense was raised
by the defendants, analyzing why its holding was to abolish the outra-
geous government conduct defense, the Seventh Circuit reached the
same conclusion in 95 words.346 In its holding, the Boyd court did not
refer to Tucker. It did, however, justify its abolishment of the defense
by finding that the due process defense had no life to begin with,347 a
conclusion that was also reached in Tucker.34 8 Although the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits now adhere to such a conclusion, and therefore take
away a viable claim for criminal defendants, this conclusion is
incorrect.
In other circuits, however, the defense continues to be raised by
defendants and addressed by courts.349 In these cases, other circuits
continue to engage in due process analysis of government conduct,
often using factor tests which have been developed by the courts since
Hampton. These holdings demonstrate that the Tucker holding is not
universally accepted, and that other circuits continue to recognize the
viability of the defense. Because of the difference in the approaches
taken by the various federal circuits, there is a circuit split as to the
viability of the due process defense.
Not only is the defense still recognized by other federal circuits, the
Sixth Circuit has also continued to do a cursory due process analysis.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 242-43. The matter being appealed in Boyd was the granting of a new trial for six
leaders and one associate of a notorious Chicago street gang, the "El Rukins." Id. at 241. The
United States appealed a finding of the district judge that the prosecutors and staff in the office
of the U.S. Attorney had "engaged in misconduct far more serious than anything involved in
typical cases in which a prosecutor is accused of the knowing use of perjured testimony or of the
violation of a defendant's right under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)." Id. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the government had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct to the extent that
required a new trial, but only after abolishing the due process defense. Id.
345. Id. at 241.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. 28 F.3d 1420, 1426 (6th Cir. 1994).
349. See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
government agent did not engineer a criminal enterprise from start to finish and that the agent
did not induce the defendant to plead guilty); United States v. Maxwell, No. 93-5917, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1631 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 1995) (refusing to overturn a conviction because govern-
ment's actions did not seriously affect the integrity or reputation of the judicial proceeding);
United States v. Laporta, 46 F.3d 152, 161 (2nd Cir. 1994) (holding after a due process analysis
that the government conduct in question did not reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness).
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In United States v. Zaia,350 the Sixth Circuit engaged in due process
analysis over a month after the Tucker decision.351 While it was un-
successful,352 the defense was available to the defendant. But this
analysis is not guaranteed in the Sixth Circuit. A panel of judges, one
of whom was the author of the Tucker opinion, Judge Suhrheinrich,
not surprisingly adhered to the Tucker holding by denying the availa-
bility of the due process defense to a defendant in United States v.
Mack.353 In Mack, the court held that any outrageous government
conduct claim "is nothing more than a claim of entrapment. '354 It is
apparent that in the Sixth Circuit the application of an outrageous
government conduct defense relies not only on the circuit in which it
is tried, but also upon the panel of circuit judges to whom the case is
presented. By abolishing the due process defense, the Sixth Circuit
has further confused the application of a necessary doctrine.
Further effects of the Tucker decision could be seen if it is accepted
by other courts, and the due process defense is consequently abol-
ished. Reaching this conclusion, through implication and contrary to
the defenses creation in the Russell dicta, the courts would in effect be
stating there could never be government conduct so egregious and
outrageous as to offend the concepts of due process. This is a difficult
conclusion to reach. If shown to be predisposed, there would be no
recourse for a defendant who has been subjected to behavior of the
type in Rochin and Twigg. If a government agent could establish this
sufficient predisposition, he may be able to abuse his awesome power
in order to obtain a conviction. The Due Process Clause prohibits
such abuse, and the court system is in place to assure it does not hap-
pen. If accepted, Tucker would sanction this type of abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
The outrageous government conduct defense was created because
Justice Rhenquist felt that in extreme situations, government conduct
.350. Nos. 93-1452, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24346 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
1252 (1995).
351. Zaia was decided September 2, 1994. Id. Tucker was decided on July 15, 1994. Tucker,
28 F.3d at 1420.
352. In Zaia, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant showed enough initiative in the
conduct of the criminal activities that the government conduct in the case could not be so outra-
geous as to "'shock the universal sense of justice.'" 1994 U.S. App. Laxis 24346, *17. The
court did note that "a recent Sixth Circuit panel decision has held.., that the defense of outra-
geous government conduct no longer exists." Id. at *17 n.6. However, the court did engage in a
due process analysis. Id. at *17.
353. 53 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995).
354. Id. (citing United States v. Thcker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
1426 (1995)).
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might be so harmful to its citizens that it would, regardless of the state
of mind of an individual defendant, do harm to both the individual
and the system it was designed to protect. That possibility still re-
mains. In Tucker, the Sixth Circuit has eliminated this valuable line of
protection.
By deciding that no Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit authority for
the defense existed, where the court record clearly states otherwise,
the Tucker court used the type of random judicial discretion it had
condemned. While the doctrine of stare decisis should be enough to
demonstrate the Tucker holding's error, important public policy de-
mands the retention of the outrageous government conduct defense.
The judicial system was designed to protect both the individual and
the government's functions. By allowing the court to have the final
determination of judging the extreme behavior of the government, the
outrageous government conduct defense accomplishes this valuable
task.
Jason R. Schulze
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